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Abstract
The level of aggregation in the industrial organization field is
generally the industry. However, several researchers have recently
suggested that the appropriate level of aggregation is the strategic
groups which exist within each industry. Mobility barriers affect firm
movements among strategic groups in an industry. They are responsible
for protecting groups from intrusion by firms outside the groups.
This research examines strategic groupings within nine different
industries. Markov processes are used to develop several indexes to
determine the degree of mobility and struggle within the individual
industries studied.
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STRATEGIC GROUPS AND MOBILITY BARRIERS:
THE LEVEL OF STRUGGLE IN AN INDUSTRY
By: Avi Fiegenbaum and Walter J. Primeaux, Jr,
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the many tasks of the field of industrial organization eco-
nomics, is the study of market processes as they direct activities of
producers in meeting consumer demand.
The market structure concept is highly developed in the economic
literature; different market structures lead to different performance
levels among participants. This difference occurs because of the rela-
tive power of firms in the economic environment in which they operate.
The level of aggregation in the industrial organization field is
generally the industry. An industry Is broadly viewed as a collection
of firms selling very similar or homogeneous products. Firms within
an industry are similar in many respects. Hunt (1972) argues, however,
that firms should be grouped into strategic groups and that type of
aggregation provides the appropriate unit for examination. Firms
within a strategic group are homogeneous to some extent and they under-
take similar strategies in the conduct of their business. Mobility
barriers affect firm movements among strategic groups in an industry
and they are responsible for protecting groups from intrusion by firm
outside the groups.
The main purpose of this study is to examine the nature and extent
of struggling and mobility barriers within several different types of
industries in a rigorous way using data and statistical analyses.
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II. NATURE OF THIS STUDY
Even though mobility barriers are very important, they have been
virtually ignored by previous empirical research. This research adapts
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Markov's probabilistic method to the analysis of firm data to provide
some new insights into the strategic group and mobility barriers con-
cepts.
Results of this research provides researchers and decision makers
very important information at both the corporate and business strategy
levels, such as:
1. The probability that a firm's strategic group will be invaded
by a firm from another strategic group.
2. The probability that any firm in a particular strategic group
will remain in the same strategic group in the following period.
Answers to these two questions also provide direct and indirect
information about the level of competition and the efficiency of mobil-
ity barriers in protecting members of a given strategic group.
In any nonmonopoly business, a firm is affected by the behavior of
rivals. Knowledge of offensive and defensive probabilities of changes
in strategic group membership, can assist policy makers of a firm
facing competition in determining the extent to which it must defend
itself and strengthen the frontier which protects it from undesirable
offensive moves. As McGee (1982) suggests, an understanding of oligo-
polistic interdependence among firms is important. This paper shows
that the application of Markov Chain Theory to strategic group analysis
provides insights and understandings of characteristics of competitive
patterns within an industry which have not been previously developed.
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The plan of this study is as follows: Section I is the introduc-
tion; section II discusses the nature of the study; section III dis-
cusses the strategic group and mobility barrier concepts and some pre-
vious studies; section IV briefly presents the theory of Markov Chains;
section V presents the method for estimating the transition probabili-
ties and some of their properties. Section VI develops four indixes
and three sub-indixes for the struggling level in an industry. Section
VII presents the empirical part of the research. Section VIII presents
the conclusions and suggestions for further research. Appendices are
at the end of the paper.
III. PREVIOUS STUDIES
Primeaux (1983a) presents a rather complete review of the strategic
group concept; consequently, only those studies which are more relevant
and germane to this research will be discussed here.
Porter (1980 p. 132) discussed one of the more valuable uses of the
strategic group concept.
The strategic group concept is an analytical device
designed to aid in structural analysis.
Each firm is somewhat unique, and, differences which exist among firms,
make it essential that researchers carefully proceed as they classify
firms within an industry into strategic groups. As suggested by Primeaux
(1983b), each industry is different and it is highly probable that appro-
priate strategic group designations for one industry (upon whatever
dimension is used) will probably be inappropriate for classifying firms
in another industry. The researcher must treat each industry individ-
ually and determine the important strategic dimensions for each industry.
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Hunt (1972, pp. 8-16) originally coined the strategic group concept
in his doctoral thesis. According to Hunt, a strategic group would be
reflected in the following:
A group of firms within the industry that are highly
symmetric. . .With respect to cost structures, degree
of product differentiation, degree of vertical inte-
gration, and the degree of product diversification...
formal organization, control system, and management
rewards and punishments. . .(and) the personal views
and preferences for various possible outcomes.
Porter (1980, p. 129) modified Hunt's definition of a strategic group.
According to Porter a strategic group is a group of firms "...in an
industry following the same or a similar strategy along strategic dimen-
sions." Firms within a strategic group may be said to be homogeneous
while firms outside that strategic group may be said to be heterogeneous,
Newman (1978) used a similar approach to that used by Hunt. Newman,
however, examined the relationship between the industry and the way
firms acted outside the industry. Therefore, according to Neuman, stra-
tegic groups
:
Turn out to be defined by their differing degrees
of vertical integration with the market in question.
Newman (1978 p. 419).
Porter (1979) used the relative size of firms within an industry to
determine strategic group membership. Porter divided all industries he
examined into two strategic groups. Leaders are those firms accounting
for thirty percent of industry sales while followers are firms within
the same industry accounting for the remaining seventy percent of sales.
Primeaux (1983b) examined investment behavior of firms in two indus-
tries and concludes that Porter's strategic group designation generated
superior results for the petroleum industry but that an alternative
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designation of three strategic groups was superior for the textile in-
dustry. The three strategic group designation used by Primeaux was
twenty percent, thirty percent and fifty percent of industry sales.
Barriers which tend to prevent a firm within an industry from
changing the strategic group to which it belongs are called mobility
barriers (Porter 1980, p. 134).
Mobility barriers provide the first major reason why
some firms in an industry will be persistently more
profitable than others. Different strategic groups
carry with them different levels of mobility barriers,
which provide some firms with persistent advantages
over others. The firms in strategic groups with high
mobility barriers will have greater profit potential
than those in groups with lower mobility barriers.
Oster (1982) actually attempted to examine mobility barriers based
on advertising strategy and identified strategic groups and mobility
barriers in certain industries.
McGee discussed the importance of mobility barriers to strategic
management research.
Classification of groups by their mobility barriers
is an appealing idea which stresses the cost advan-
tages enjoyed by group members and emphasizes the
elapsed time as well as the investment expenditures
required of would be entrants to overcome the bar-
riers. (McGee 1982 p. 6).
McGee further says
:
The generalization of entry barriers into mobility
barriers allows a richer and more realistic por-
trayal of the process of entry and the motives for
diversification. . .the nature of oligopolistic inter-
dependencies is illuminated by the pattern of group
memberships and the change in membership over time.
(McGee 1982 p. 9).
In the empirical section of this study, market share is used as the
basis for determining strategic group membership. The business litera-
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ture generally shows a strong relationship between market share and
4
profitability; consequently, we assume that the market share boundaries
of the strategic groups reflect mobility barriers which prevent all
firms in an industry from being equally profitable. This designation
is consistent with Porter (1980, p. 134) who explained that mobility
barriers provide the first major reason why some firms in an industry
will be persistently more profitable than others.
IV. THE MARKOV PROCESS
One important objective of positive economics is to describe how
economic data are generated. If one can understand the process which
generates changes in the observed data, they are in a better position
to predict the future time path of data and to control the economic
variables. Marschak (1953) explained that "economic data are generated
by systems of relations that are in general stochastic, dynamic and
simultaneous." Markov processes are useful applications in dynamic
analyses which use lagged variables to illustrate the relationship and
dependence between economic variables across time. In this type of
analysis "Current values of economic variables are assumed to depend
on earlier values of the same variables." (Telser 1963).
The Markov theory of stochastic processes is concerned with the
probabilities of moving from one state to another. In the analysis
presented here, we observe and study firms moving from one strategic
group to another, as will be discussed in a later section of this
paper. Markov Chains are well suited to this type of analysis. The
reader who is unfamiliar with Markov Chains will find a brief review
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in an appendix of this paper; an even more thorough treatment is pre-
sented in Horowitz (1970).
V. THE ESTIMATION OF THE TRANSITION PROBABILITIES FROM FIRM DATA
As explained in the previous section and in the appendix, a Markov
chain specification is a probability model for analyzing time series
data. In this investigation, we are interested in determining whether
any firms, starting within a given strategic group, have changed group
membership through time.
The simplest model can be characterized as one with a finite number
of possible outcomes, Si (i=l,2, . . .r) ; and the outcome (in this study
of strategic group membership) of a given trial, at all stages, depends
only on the outcome of the immediately preceding trial.
P (S. _,/S, ) = P.,j,t+l i,t ij
This probability has the following properties
(1) P. . >
(2) EP =1
i=l 3
There are several ways of estimating the transition probability,
P . . One way is by the method of Maximum Likelihood (ML) presented by
Anderson and Goodman (1957) and Goodman (1953) as:
P = [P, J - hLij j r
I n. .
when n = E n
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where n
.
represents the number of firms moving from state i to state j
for t years. State i is equivalent to strategic group i. The idea
behind this estimate is that we can count the number of times firms
move from strategic group i to strategic group j and divide that number
by the number of occurrences of strategic group i.
The ML estimator is consistent but is not generally unbiased
(Kendall and Stuart 1961, pp. 39-40). However, Kendall and Stuart show
that by increasing the sample size, the bias moves toward zero. They
also show that the estimates are asymptotically normally distributed.
VI. THE INDUSTRY STRUGGLING INDEXES
In this section we develop seven Indexes to characterize the level
of struggling within an industry. We call these struggling indexes
because they give an indication of the overall movement or struggle
which takes place within an industry.
For example, we have the following transition probabilities matrix
P:
v tO\i 12 3
from *
1
P = 2
3
1,1 1,2 1,3
2,1 2,2 2,3
3,1 3,2 3,3
In this example we have three strategic groups. Strategic group 1
includes firms with the higher market share while strategic group 3 in-
cludes firms with lower market share, while strategic group 2 includes
firms with market shares between these two extremes.
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P.. indicates Che firm transition probability of moving from stra-
tegic group i to strategic group j. The left diagonal elements indicate
the probabilities of a firm moving from strategic group 3 to strategic
group 2 or 1 and from strategic group 2 to strategic group 1. The
right diagonal elements indicate the probabilities of firms moving
from strategic group 1 to strategic groups 2 or 3, and from strategic
groups 2 to strategic groups 3.
We develop four main industry indexes and three additional sub-
indexes. The sub-indexes are derived from the main indexes; they
provide important additional information.
a. The industry struggling indexes
(1) The industry stability index - P
Z P. .
i i 1,j
P - =**-. for i=isi J
The sum of the diagonal elements (elements 1.1, 2.2, 3.3) is in the
numerator. The sum of these elements indicate the probability that
firms in the industry being studied will remain in the same strategic
group in the next year. The number of strategic groups in this
industry is presented in the denominator.
The industry stability index indicates the average probability that
a firm in any one of the three strategic groups in this example will
remain in the same strategic group in adjacent years.
(2) The industry climbing index - P
E P,
.
i i 1J
P = —^ for i > j
(i
-i)/2
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The left diagonal elements (elements 2.1, 3.1, 3.2) are in the
numerator. The sum of these elements gives the probability of moving
from a lower strategic group to a higher strategic group. The climbing
index gives the average probability that a firm in a lower strategic
group will move to a higher strategic group in an adjacent year. The
number of events is in the denominator.
(3) The declining industry index - P
I P,
.
i i iJ
P = -^ for i < j
° (i -i)/2
The idea behind this index is basically the same as in the previous
index; here, however, we are looking at the right side diagonals' ele-
ments. The declining index represents the average probability that a
firm moves from a higher strategic group to a lower strategic group in
an adjacent year. The number of events is in the denominator.
(4) The industry struggling index - P
£ P,
= ±A ij
St (i2-i)
for i * j
The sum of the matrix elements, excluding the Diagonal elements, is in
the numerator and the number of events involved in these transitions is
in the denominator.
The struggling index gives the average probability that a firm in a
given industry will move outside his current strategic group; this move-
ment, of course, could be to either a higher or a lower strategic group.
-11-
This is called an industry struggling index because it gives an indi-
cation of the overall movement or struggling taking place within an
industry.
A high struggling index means that the relative position of firms
in the industry, with respect to market shares, is not very well
established . In this case, most of the firms are trying to improve
their positions and if some succeed other firms in the industry suffer
from their improvements. The firms losing market share, however, may
still enjoy high profits because of the profit potential which may
exist in the industry. A high struggling index indicates low mobility
barriers and vice-versa.
A high level of struggling will occur most frequently in industries
that are in the introductory stage of the industry life cycle, as firms
attempt to take advantage of emerging opportunities as the industry
develops
.
b. The sub-industries indexes
From the previous four indexes, three sub-indexes were developed.
These additional indexes are important because the most probable out-
come, excluding remaining in the same strategic group, is that firms
will either move up or down by only one step at a time. That is, a
firm may move to the next highest or lowest strategic group within its
industry, but it is not likely to move up or down by more than one step
at a time.
The above information is taken into consideration in the develop-
ment of the following indexes.
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(5) The sub-climbing index - Psub-c
2 P.
.
n v i,j 1,J for i > jPsub-c = fj rr „ J .(i-1) and i-j = 1
The numerator presents the sum of the probabilities of moving to
a strategic group that is located only one level higher. For example,
moving from strategic group 2 to strategic group 1, but not from stra-
tegic group 3 to strategic group 1.
The number of events is in the denominator. For example in an
industry with three strategic groups we have a 3x3 transition probabi-
lities matrix; so i-1 = 3-1 = 2 element (2.1, 3.2). Therefore, the
sub climbing index (Psub-c) gives the average effective probability
of a firm moving to a strategic group one level higher.
(6) The industry sub-declining index - (Psub-d)
E P
« ^ 3 i»j for i < iPsub-d = y. r-r . . , J .(i-1) and j-i = 1
This index is calculated in the same manner as the sub-climbing
index; the difference is that in this case we use the right side ele-
ments of the diagonal. This index gives the average effective proba-
bility of a firm moving down only one level to a lower strategic
group.
(7) The sub-struggling index - (Psub-st)
I P.
.
psub-st = hill for i * jr o
(i_1)+(i_ 1) and i_j = ±1
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This index is actually a combination of the previous two, and it
gives the average effective probability that a firm in a given industry
will move toward a different strategic group either one level higher or
lower.
The next section presents the empirical analysis based on the models
presented here.
VII. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Data from the textile, computer, chemical, drug, lumber, perfume,
petroleum, newspaper, and metal industries were selected for examina-
tion.
The years selected for study were 1969-1979 because complete data
are available on corapustat tapes for the selected industries during
that time interval. Table I-A in the appendix presents the number of
firms included from each industry, as well as the number of years of
data for each industry studied. This table also presents the results
of a statistical test which is discussed later.
The first step in the research procedure was to decide what vari-
able or set of variables would be used for the strategic group classi-
fications. As we know from the literature, there is no prescribed
basis or bases of strategic group designation which is acceptable to
all researchers. In this study, as mentioned earlier, firm market
share was used as the criterion of strategic group membership. While
using alternative variables to establish strategic group membership may
be useful, in practice other strategic variables are highly correlated
with market share. As Porter (1980 p. 130) says:
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... firms in the same, strategic group generally
resemble one another closely in many ways besides
their broad strategies. They tend to have similar
market shares and also to be affected by and respond
similarly to external events or competitive moves in
the industry because of their similar strategies,
(italics added).
The above quote supports the selection of market share as an appropriate
variable for determining strategic group membership; as explained below,
however, the basic approach used here is really independent of the var-
iable used to establish strategic groups. In other words, the method
presented here could be adapted to any method of strategic group deter-
mination.
The second step in the research process was to determine the appro-
priate intervals for each strategic group; in other words, it was
necessary to establish the range of market shares, for each strategic
group, in each industry. This step determined the number of strategic
groups in each industry as well as the groupings within each industry.
Obviously each industry is unique and differs both on the basis of the
number of strategic groups as well as the market share range of its
strategic groups.
To determine the intervals of the strategic groups within each
industry, we began by examining the data for the first period, 1969.
For each industry, we plotted each firm's market share on a scale
ranging from zero percent to one hundred percent. Then, by inspection
we determined that a strategic group existed where the market shares
clustered; consequently, the variance of market shares among members
of a given strategic group would be smaller than it would be if any
other firm in an adjoining strategic group or any firm in any other
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strategic group within the industry were included within that strategic
group. This procedure established five strategic group for some indus-
tries and six strategic groups for other industries being examined.
However, this was determined by the groupings observed in the data and
not predetermined by the procedure. Indeed, if an industry not included
in this study were examined, it is possible that four or perhaps even
seven strategic groups would be observed in that industry.
The intervals established in the beginning period for strategic
groups within a given industry were also used for that industry for the
ending period. Then, we traced the year to year growth pattern of each
firm in terms of its movement (or lack of movement) from one strategic
group to another in its industry, using the Markov procedure discussed
earlier.
Results
a. Transition probabilities
Tables 1 through 9 present the transition probability matrices for
each industry. These probabilities give some useful insights into the
dynamic aspects of the strategic groups, and mobility barriers within
each industry studied.
Tables 1 through 9 are read in the following manner. The number on
the vertical stub of the table indicated as i represents the strategic
groups that the firm moves from at the beginning year and the number on
the horizontal stub indicated as j represents the strategic group that
the firm goes to in the adjacent year. The market share interval of
each strategic group within the industry is also given in the table.
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The following discussion explains how the numbers in Table 1 should be
interpreted; this information will also be useful in helping the reader
understand the tables for the other industries included in the sample.
The diagonal element gives the probability of a firm within a given
strategic group at the beginning of the year remaining in that group at
the end of the year. For example, Table 1 shows that the probability
is 88% that a firm in strategic group I at the beginning of the year
would remain in strategic group I at the end of the year. The table
also shows that the probability is that a firm in strategic group III
at the beginning of the year would move to strategic group V at the end
of the year. The table also shows that any firm with a market share
ranging from 20% to 26.99%, in the textile mill products industries
would be categorized as being in strategic group I; a firm with a
market share ranging from 0% to .99% would be designated to be in stra-
tegic group V, etc. This procedure should also be followed in inter-
preting data in other tables.
The elements on the diagonal indicate, for all industries studied
here, a strong tendency for firms to remain within a given strategic
group from year to year. For all industries studied, the probability
that a given firm would remain in the same strategic group from one
year to the next was higher than the probability that it would move to
another strategic group. This tendency is indicated by the fact that
the values of the main diagonal are higher than the off diagonal
elements
.
The fact that a number of elements reflect a zero probability is
not surprising. This condition is partially caused by the fact that a
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zero probability exists of a firm moving up or down by more than one
strategic group; that is, the probability of a firm moving from stra-
tegic group III to I or IV to II, or moves of this nature.
Of the nine industries studied here, only in the textile mill pro-
ducts industry (Table 1) and the drug industry (Table 4) did all firms
have a probability of moving from one strategic group to another.
That is, in these two industries, all firms were able to move from the
strategic group in which they operated to another during a given year
because an absorbing state did not exist (see appendix). For the re-
maining seven industries, however, conditions were somewhat different.
At least one absorbing state existed in each of those industries;
meaning that once a firm entered a certain strategic group mobility
barriers were too high for them to move to another group.
A chi square test was used to test the hypothesis of stationary
conditions for the industries studied. The calculations are presented
on Table I-A in the appendix, along with some additional discussion.
The results are statistically significant at better than the .5 per-
cent level for all industries. These results mean that the assumption
of stationary conditions for all industries studied cannot be rejected.
A more complete discussion of the test is presented in the appendix.
b. The struggling industry indexes and sub-indexes
The struggling index, which is around one percent for most indus-
tries
,
reveals that there is a rather low probability of a firm
changing strategic groups in adjacent years.
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The sub-indexes examines the same relationships as the basic
indexes. The only difference is that the sub-indexes do not consider
two stage moves or transitions over more than one strategic group; the
earlier analysis and discussion, however, have shown such moves to be
nonexistent.
Tables 10 and 11 present the 4 struggling indexes and the 3 strug-
gling sub-indexes developed for all firms in each industry in the
sample.
The stability index in Table 10 shows that in 8 out of the 9 indus-
tries in the sample, the probability of a firm remaining in the same
strategic group during the next period is very high (more than 90%).
Only in the metal mining industry, is the probability substantially
lower; however, even in this case the probability remains quite high at
80.86. These overall results are not surprising. The high stability
index value means that the movement among strategic group membership is
not fluid; that is, firms do not easily move back and forth from one
strategic group to another. This condition reflects the existence of
mobility barriers which tend to prevent a firm from moving to a more
profitable or favorable strategic group, at will.
In six of the nine industries examined, the declining index is
higher than the climbing index. This condition reveals that firms in
more favorable strategic groups (higher market share and thus higher
profits) are protected by high mobility barriers from entry by firms
outside their strategic groups. The stability index supports this
result.
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C. Industry results
The statistical results for the individual industries examined in
this study are presented in the following discussion.
Textile Mill Products (Table 1)
This is one of the two industries that does not have an absorbing
state. This means that more flexibility exists for firms to move in
this industry; that is, mobility barriers are lower than in the seven
other industries with absorbing states. For this industry, strategic
groups III, IV, and V constitute a closed set. This means that firms
can move among these three strategic groups; however, mobility barriers
absolutely prevent them from moving to the preferred I or II groups.
Movement from strategic groups I or II to a lower strategic group is
possible but this would constitute a move to an inferior state or
smaller market share and, thus, lower profits. The results show that
mobility barriers protect members of strategic group II from firms in
groups III, IV, and V but group II is not protected from group I.
The stability index is 92.2% and the sub-declining index is 5%,
while the sub-climbing index is 4.57%. The overall sub-struggling
index for this industry is 4.78%.
Electronic Computing Equipment (Table 2)
In this industry two of the six strategic groups are in absorbing
states. Strategic group V and VI are a closed set; that means that
firms in group V and VI can move between these two groups but cannot go
to a higher (more favorable) strategic group. Firms in group I, on the
otherhand, with high market shares face a high probability of losing
their leadership positions in the industry.
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The two absorbing state situations and the closed set reveal that
in this industry the mobility barriers are high; this condition can be
explained by the nature of the industry, which requires high invest-
ments by a firm in both capital equipment and R&D to improve its com-
petitive position.
The large difference between the sub-declining index and the sub-
climbing index (6.25 and 1.81 respectively, see Table 11), shows that
high mobility barriers protect firms in the more favorable strategic
groups from other firms which are trying to improve their position in
the industry; at the same time, the results show that firms in any
strategic group (except the lowest) can readily move to a lower strate-
gic group. The results show that firms in the leading strategic group
have a twenty percent probability of losing their leadership position.
The rapidly changing technology and the importance of new breakthroughs
in computer hardware partially explain firm movements among strategic
groups
.
The results also show that the overall sub-struggling index is 4.03%.
Chemical and Allied Products (Table 3)
This industry has only one absorbing state; this is strategic group
I. Firms in this group are leaders; they cannot leave the group they
are in. Since all other groups represent an inferior state, a firm
would not be inclined to willingly leave group I for another position
in the industry. The high mobility barriers which exist can be par-
tially explained by the high level of R&D which exists in this
industry.
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Firms in the lower level strategic groups are able to sustain suf-
ficient R&D expenditures to maintain their positions and sometimes move
into a higher strategic group. However, they are unable to generate R&D
results which will push them into the very highest group. Strategic
groups IV and V constitute a closed set in this industry. Firms in these
groups are able to move between these two groups but they are unable to
move to a higher level, such as group III. Moreover, conditions in this
industry are such that firms in strategic group III cannot move to a
lower strategic group.
This is one of three industries in which the climbing index is higher
than the declining index (3.60 and .50 respectively). This result occurs
largely because of the high probability of firms moving from strategic
group V to IV. The overall sub-struggling index is 2.05%.
Drugs (Table 4)
This is the second industry which does not have an absorbing state.
Two closed sets exist in the industry; strategic groups I, II, and III
constitute one closed set and strategic groups IV and V constitute the
second set. This kind of situation means that firms with low market
share (strategic groups IV and V) face very high mobility barriers pre-
venting them from moving to a higher strategic groups. Consequently,
they must struggle among themselves to gain higher market share. On
the otherhand, firms in higher strategic groups face lower mobility
barriers and they have a better opportunity to move to the top strategic
group. These results show that R&D activity, which is significant in
this industry, can generate a product which can catapult a firm into a
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higher strategic group. The results also show that this type of results
is most likely to occur in firms in higher strategic groups.
The sub-declining index is higher than the sub-climbing index (3.75%
and 1.87% respectively). The value of the index in this industry can
be explained by the relatively high probability of a firm in strategic
group I and IV to fall to a lower strategic group (5% and 8.6% respec-
tively). The overall sub-struggling index is 2.77%.
Lumber and Wood Products (Table 5)
Two of the five strategic groups in this industry are in absorbing
states; also, groups I and II constitute a closed set. Moreover, group
V may also be considered an absorbing state for any reasonable purpose,
because the probability of the main diagonal is 99.1%. This structure
is very interesting; the results mean that stability exists among firms
in the low market share strategic groups and there is struggling among
firms In the high market share strategic groups.
The sub-declining index is higher than the sub-climbing index (2.11%
and 4.44% respectively). The explanation for this outcome is the high
probability for firms in strategic group I to lose their leading posi-
tion and to move (or fall) to strategic group II. The overall struggling
sub-index is 3.26%.
Perfumes (Table 6)
Two absorbing states exist in this industry; these are for strategic
groups I and II. These results mean that firms in the two highest stra-
tegic groups tended to keep their same relative positions in the industry.
The results also mean that a firm in either strategic group I or II would
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aot tend to leave the strategic group with which is associated. Conse-
quently, mobility barriers, preventing firms in lower strategic groups
from moving into group I or II, were extremely high. Indeed, "perfect"
mobility barriers exist for group I, meaning that mobility into that
group is impossible. At the same time, firms in strategic groups III,
IV, and V faced relatively lower mobility barriers and changes in stra-
tegic group membership was more likely to occur in those groups.
The high mobility barriers in this industry originate from formulae
developed by the stronger firms, which create strong brand preference
on the part of consumers. This strong brand preference is not present
for products of firms in the lower strategic groups; consequently,
mobility barriers are lower among those groups.
The sub-climbing (2.45%) and sub-declining indexes (2.02%) are simi-
lar in magnitude for this industry; the overall sub-struggling index Is
2.23%.
Petroleum Refining (Table 7)
There is one absorbing state in this industry—strategic group I.
Strategic groups II, III, IV, V, and VI are a closed set; there is no
way for a firm to move from this set to strategic group I. This result
means that firms in strategic group I are well protected from firms in
other strategic groups, because of high mobility barriers. One possible
cause of the high mobility barriers could be the large fixed asset re-
quirements necessary to become one of the larger firms in this industry.
Another possible source of mobility barriers is the ownership of large
crude oil reserves and petroleum production which distinguishes the very
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large from the smaller firms in this industry. Other factors, such
as the ability to undertake large capital expenditures to adopt the
most recent efficiency inducing technology, as well as the ability to
exploit economies of scale in production (causing operating costs to
be lower)
,
give the larger firms advantages over the smaller companies
in this industry. All-in-all, the mobility barriers are at least par-
tially caused by the financial strength of the large firms compared
with smaller firms; also, mobility barriers are erected by the sheer
size of production plants of the larger firms which smaller firms are
unable to achieve. Perhaps other factors are involved but the items
discussed above are certainly important in preventing smaller firms
from migrating into strategic group II. Firms in lower level strategic
groups, how-ever, are not totally protected by mobility barriers. The
sub-declining index (2.84%) is very similar to the climbing sub-index
(2.64%). The struggling index is 2.74%.
Newspapers (Table 8)
Strategic groups I, II, and IV are absorbing states in this indus-
try. Firms in strategic group I are protected by high mobility barriers
because it is impossible for a firm to move to that group from strategic
group II. Part of the explanation for these results rests in the fact
that market size limits the ability of a newspaper to grow; that is, a
newspaper in a city the size of New York City is able to grow to a level
which is Impossible in Houston, Texas, for example. The nature of the
industry is the limiting factor. National newspapers, which have rela-
tively unlimited markets, are not common in this country. Firms may
-25-
move from strategic group VI to V, V to IV, and III to II because of
relatively low mobility barriers.
The sub-climbing index is higher than the sub-declining index
(3.87% and 1.66% respectively). The overall struggling sub-index is
2.76%.
Metal Mining (Table 9)
There are two closed sets in this industry but there are no
absorbing states. One closed set is composed of groups I, II and III
and the second closed set consists of strategic groups IV, V and VI.
Firms belonging to groups IV, V and VI are able to move among those
strategic groups (which are the lower market share groups) but they
are unable to move into groups I, II and III. This means that mobility
barriers are relatively low within this closed set but they are high
among the sets.
These results mean that in this industry a small market share firm
cannot become a large market share firm and vice versa. The results
partially reflect the necessity for firms in this industry to have
access to mineral ores either by leases or through ownership. Mobility
is partially impared by the financial resources necessary to acquire
the mining rights necessary for growth. This is the only industry in
which the stability index is lower than 90%; the 80.86%, which repre-
sents relatively low stability, is explained by the high probability
of firms moving only within the closed set to which they belonged.
The sub-declining index is higher than the sub-climbing index (14.96%
and 10.40% respectively). The struggling sub-index is 12.68%.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The main purpose of this study is to examine the nature of strug-
gling and mobility barriers within several different types of indus-
tries. The results provide some additional perspectives on market
structure and reveal some important aspects of dynamics within an
industry.
The results show that firms within a given industry tended to
remain within the same strategic group through adjacent years. The
analyses also show that, generally, in adjacent years the probability
is higher that a firm will move from a higher strategic group (with a
larger market share) to a lower strategic group (with a smaller market
share) than is the probability of moving in the opposite direction.
Consequently, it is the "upward mobility" which is most difficult.
Care must be taken in applying and interpreting the seven indexes
which characterize the level of struggling within an industry. It is
only valid to make inferences from the indexes for firms within the
same industry. Comparisons across industries lead to bias conclusions.
The results of this research add further empirical support to the
theory of strategic groups and provides some empirical results showing
the existence of mobility barriers between strategic group. As one
might have expected, the nature of mobility barriers differs from
industry to industry and among strategic groups within an industry.
Industry economists presently speak broadly about market structure
in terras of monopoly, oligopoly and perfectly competitive models. They
speak more specifically about market structure in terms of advertising
expenditure, product differentiation, barriers to entry and exit,
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econoraies of scale and other structural dimensions. Use of a level
of a struggling index would add a dynamic aspect to industry analysis
which should be useful and meaningful to observers of an industry.
Such an index would provide important additional information about
competitive structure.
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APPENDIX
THE MARKOV PROCESS
The purpose of this appendix is to present a brief review of Markov '
processes which are essential to the analysis presented in the text of
this paper. One who is interested in more detail may benefit from re-
viewing the literature of management science such as Horowitz (1970),
Markov processes or chains can be described in the following dis-
cussion:
If we have r "states" (state = strategic group),
designated S. (i=l,2,3, . .
.
,r)
The probability that a firm belongs to state i, in time t (t is for
time), is given by:
(1) P(Slt ) - m1(t
If the states occur independently on the successive trials, then
the probability of alternative states is the product of the probabilities'
states. For example, the probability of the sequence S. on trial t and
S . on trial t+1 is
:
3
(2) P(s
i, t > <W =mi, t ,mj,t+i
A zero order Markov process assumes that states occur independently
on successive trials. The process is also known as a Bernouli process.
In a first order Markov chain, the probability of a given state on
any one trial is conditional on the trial which preceded it.
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For example, if the probability of state j on trial t+1 is condi-
tional on state i on trial t this is denoted P.
.
; we then have:
< 3
>
p < sj>t+i/si >t > = pij
The absence of t subscripts on P.
.
is not an accident. It indicates
that the probability of a transition from i to j is the same for all
trials (stationary); it does not depend on time. The transition proba-
bilities ? J . can be represented in the form of transition matrix P
11
21
nl
...
n
P
12 ' • ' '
P
in
22
'
nn
where I P,
.
1
and P. > for all i,j
For example, P
. denotes the probability of firm moving from strategic
* »
J
group i to strategic group j, and it is given for every pair of states.
In the case of the first order Markov chain, the probability of the
sequence Si on trial t and Sj on trial t+1 is
(4) P(S. „,S. ..) = m. -P.
.i,t' j, t+1 i,t i,j
As we can see from equation (4), knowledge of the state which
occurred on trial t affects the expectation of the state which will
occur on trial t+1.
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Second or higher order processes allow the transition probabilities
to vary according to the outcomes of two or more preceding trials. In
other words, we can say that a process is h order if the occurrence of
a state on trial t+1 depends on the r states which occurred on the h
preceding trials.
There are a variety of Markov processes that may be grouped
according to:
1. Whether the order is zero, first or higher order
2. Whether the Markov states are finite or infinite
3. Whether the transition probabilities are stationary or non-
stationary
4. Whether the time variable is continuous or discrete
The most common used Markov model in the marketing, economic,
o
and psychology literature is called the "Markov chain " and it involves
first order, finite states, stationary transition probabilities and
discrete time.
The assumptions of the first order Markov chain are quite realistic
and consistent with the study of strategic management and business
policy. Those assumptions include: the position of a firm today is
affected by its position in the previous period. A second assumption
is also quite realistic; that is, we can usually divide an economic
variable into a finite number of categories. An assumption relating
to discrete time is also valid since economic data are often available
in the form of annual data. However, the validity of the stationary
assumption, relative to the parameters of the probability system, may
not be clear in many cases.
-31-
A more reasonable assumption may be that the transition probabili-
ties vary over time and are functions of certain explanatory variables;
the probabilities change as these variables change. Telser (1962), in
research of cigarette brand consumption, assumed that the transition
probabilities, relating to the switching from one cigarette brand to
another, depended on the relative prices of the brands and the relative
advertising expenditures of the companies.
In the research presented in this paper, we assume' that the tran-
sition probabilities of firm switching from one strategic group to
2
another are stationary. We tested this hypothesis by a Chi square (X )
9
test, and we could not reject the null hypothesis of stationarity.
In first order Markov processes, there are several ways of classi-
fying Markov chains. Two important classifications used in the text of
this paper are (1) absorbing state and (2) closed set.
An absorbing state occurs when a firm, in a given strategic group,
is unable to move to another group. This condition is seen to exist on
some of the transition probability tables in the text of this study.
The following discussion presents an example of an absorbing state. If
the first row of the matrix is the vector (1,0,0,0,0). Because P.. . 1
and P., (j=2,3,4,5), this indicates that a firm in strategic group
I will not leave that group. In this case SI is called an absorbing
state.
A closed state exists if no set outside of the set can be reached
from any state within the set.
For example:
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.7
.6
.2
.3
.4
.1
.6
.1
'J
S, and S
2 combine to form a closed set S^. This is . closed set
since neither S nor S can be reached from S
.* 12
(P
sl,s3
= P
sl,s4
= P
s2,s3 " Ps2,s4
=
°>
In this example, S
4 U both a closed set and an absorbing state.
This appendix does not intend to explain all possibilities or ver-
sions of Markov chains. We merely describe the most important points
Co explain the basic concepts to the reader who may not be familiar
with these models. 10 These models give us a good explanation of the
link between strategic groups and mobility barriers. These two ele-
ments are essential to this study.
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FOOTNOTES
For discussions of the industrial organization field see Bain
1968 and Scherer 1980.
2
For complete statements of the theory of finite Markov chains see
Kemeny and Snell (1960), Bailey (1964) and Cox and Miller (1965).
3
For complete statements of corporate strategy and business stra-
tegy see Schendal and Hofer (1979).
4
See for example Buzzel, Gale and Sultan (1975).
For two industries, computer and newspaper, the selected years
were 1973-1979 and 1974-1979 respectively. This difference exists
because we did not have complete data.
In the marketing literature, Ehrenberg (1965) applied Markov
theory to brand-switching data. Lipstein (1965) presented a mathema-
tical model of consumer behavior, related advertising effort to atti-
tude changes and consumer purchases, using a nonstationary Markov
process. Thompson and McNeal (1967) applied a Markov process to
measure changes in customer propensities to buy.
The concepts of Markov chains was introduced around 1907. Solow
(1951) applied this concept to the analysis of income and wage distri-
butions. Hart and Prais (1956) employed the technique in an investiga-
tion of business concentration. Adelman (1958) used the same approach
in analyzing the size distribution of firms within the steel industry.
Telster (1962) measured brand-switching of consumers in the cigarette
industry. Thorburn (1981) used a Markov chain for forecasting the
agriculture structure.
Q
Goodman (1953), Miller (1952) and Madansky (1959) used Markov
chains to measure change of attitude and other psychological variables.
9
See Lee, Judge and Zellner (1970) p. 51 for an application of the
identical test.
See also Horowitz 1970, chapter 14, section 3 (14.3).
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Table I-A
X Test
Industry n(# of firms) t(# of years) calculated x
2
2 x r- book
'.5
1. Textile
2. Computer
3. Chemicals
4
.
Drugs
5. Lumber
6. Perfume
29
37
18
26
13
16
7. Petroleum 46
8. Newspaper 13
9. Metal 20
11
7
11
11
11
11
11
6
11
32.11 168.77
31.75 160.01
26.72 168.77
46.25 168.77
23.12 168.77
28.96 168.77
61.63 266.59
17.62 133.94
30.51 266.59
See some additional discussion on preceding page.
2
*X is significant at the .5% level for all industries.
Table 1
IND. 2200 (SIC CODE)
TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS - transition probabilities*
TO
FROM
\. S'Gj
S*Gi \^ j=l II III IV V
i=I 88 12
II 10.5 84 5.5
III 98 2
IV .8 98.4 .8
V 7 93
Market Share
Intervals (%)
20 - 26.99
10 - 19.99
3 - 9.99
1 - 2.99
- .99
*A11 probabilities are given in percentage.
Table 2
IND. 3573 (SIC CODE)
ELECTRONIC COMPUTING EQUIPMENT - transition probabilities*
FROM
r
:o
\. S«Gj j=I II III IV V VI
Market Share
Intervals (%)
i=I 80 20 28 - 40
II 100 16 - 28
III 100 6-16
IV 6.25 87.5 6.25 2-6
V 95 5 .5-2
VI 2.8 97.2 - .5
*A11 probabilities are given in percentage.
Table 3
IND. 2800 (SIC CODE)
CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS - transition probabilities*
TO
FROM
\. S-Gj j-l II III IV V
i=I 100
II 4 96
III 1.8 98.2
IV 98 2
V 8.6 91.4
Market Share
Intervals (%)
11 - 17.99
7 - 10.99
4 - 6.99
2 - 3.99
- 1.99
*A11 probabilities are given in percentage.
Table 4
IND. 2830 (SIC CODE)
DRUGS - transition probabilities*
TO
FROM
S-Gi ^ j-l II III IV V
i=I 95 5
II 1.5 97 1.5
III 3.7 96.3
IV 91.4 8.6
V 2.4 97.6
Market Sbare
Intervals (%)
10 - 14.99
5 - 9.99
2 - 4.99
1 - 1.99
- .99
*A11 probabilities are given in percentage.
Table 5
IND. 2400 (SIC CODE)
LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS - transition probabilities*
TO
FROM
\. S'Gj
S-Gi\^ j-I II III IV V
I-I 82.3 17.7
II 7.6 92.4
III 100
IV 100
V .9 99.1
Market Share
Intervals (%)
26 - 34.99
18 - 25.99
10 - 17.99
4 - 9.99
- 3.99
*A11 probabilities are given in percentage.
Table 6
IND. 2844 (SIC CODE)
PERFUMES - transition probabilities*
TO
FROM
\S-Cj
S'Gi \ j = l II III IV V
i=I 100
II 100
III 5.8 88.2 5.8
IV 2.3 95.4 2.3
V 1.6 98.4
Market Share
Intervals
22 - 29.99
14 - 21.99
6 - 13.99
2 - 5.99
- 1.99
*A11 probabilities are given in percentage.
Table 7
IND. 2911 (SIC CODE)
PETROLEUM REFINING - transition probabilities*
FROM
r
:o
S»Gi
S'Gj j=l II III IV V VI
Market Share
Intervals (%)
i=I 100 10 - 24.99
II 97.8 2.2 6 - 9.99
III 6 88 6 4 - 5.99
IV 2 98 1 - 3.99
V 2.9 91.1 6 0.5 - .99
VI 2.3 97.7 - .49
*A11 probabilities are given in percentage.
Table 8
IND. 2711 (SIC CODE)
NEWSPAPER: PUBLISHING - PRINT - transition probabilities*
FROM
'
:o
S«Gi
S-Gj 3-1 II III IV V VI Market Share
Intervals (%)
i=I 100 23 - 34.99
II 100 15 - 22.99
III 8.3 83.4 8.3 10 - 14.99
IV 100 5 - 9.99
V 4.3 95.6 2 - 4.99
VI 6.7 93.3 - 1.99
*A11 probabilities are given in percentage.
Table 9
IND. 1000 (SIC CODE)
METAL MINING - transition probabilities*
FROM
r
:o
S»Gi \^ j-I II III IV V VI
i=I 78.5 21.5
II 19 76 5
III 17 83
IV 66.7 33.3
V 4 81 15
VI 12 88
Market Share
Intervals (%)
21 - 30.99
16 - 20.99
10 - 15.99
5 - 9.99
1 - 4.99
- .99
*A11 probabilities are given in percentage.
Table 10
THE STRUGGLING INDUSTRY INDEXES*
INDUSTRY P_ STABILITY _P CLIMBING _P DECLINING _P STRUGGLING
2200 (TEXTILE) 92.20 1.83 < 2 1.91
3573 (COMPUTER) 93.27 .60 < 2.08 1.34
2800 (CHEMICAS) 96.72 1.44 > .20 .82
2830 (DRUGS) 95.42 .75 < 1.50 1.12
2400 (LUMBER) 94.77 .85 < 1.76 1.30
2844 (PERFUME) 96.40 .98 > .81 .89
2911 (PETROLEUM) 95.41 .88 < .94 .91
2711 (NEWSPAPER) 95.38 1.29 > .55 .91
1000 (METAL
MINING) 80.86 3.46 < 4.99 4.22
*A11 the indexes are given in percentage.
Table 11
THE STRUGGLING INDUSTRY SUB-INDEXES*
INDUSTRY P_ SUB-CLIMBING _P SUB-DECLINING P_ SUB-STRUGGLING
2200 (TEXTILE) 4.57 < 5 4.78
3573 (COMPUTER) 1.81 < 6.25 4.03
2800 (CHEMICALS) 3.60 > .50 2.05
2830 (DRUGS) 1.87 < 3.75 2.77
2400 (LUMBER) 2.11 < 4.44 3.26
2844 (PERFUME) 2.45 > 2.02 2.23
2911 (PETROLEUM) 2.64 < 2.84 2.74
2711 (NEWSPAPER) 3.87 > 1.66 2.76
1000 (METAL) 10.40 < 14.96 12.68
*A11 the indexes are given in percentage.


